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ADOLESCENCE, MENTAL RETARDATION, AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: THE SIREN CALL OF ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
VICTOR L. STREIB*
I. INTRODUCTION
The decision in Atkins v. Virginia' appears to be one final effort to separate the
death penalty's Siamese twins:2 juvenile offenders3 and mentally retarded offenders.4
Having whipsawed our courts and legislatures for the past twenty years, these
capital siblings appear to be in cahoots against the fading forces trying to maintain
these age-old practices. Offenders in either category can and do commit horrible
crimes that are devastating to the victim's family and to the broader community.
However, the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that the decision
to impose the death penalty must be based both upon the nature and circumstances
of the offense and upon the character and background of the offender. Juvenile or
mentally retarded offenders often more than meet the first requirement but fail to
meet the second requirement. The question posed by this article is whether they
always fail to have a character and background sufficient to make them eligible for
execution. Atkins has said "yes" for mentally retarded offenders,7 and the same
answer surely must follow for juvenile offenders.
This article will first explore the evolution of constitutional law as it permits or
restricts the death penalty for juvenile offenders. Following that section is a similar
exploration of constitutional law and the death penalty for mentally retarded
offenders. Given these background sections, the major section of this article
compares and contrasts these two areas of constitutional law. The vehicle for this
comparative analysis is the Supreme Court's opinion in Atkins, our most recent
beacon in this area of law. The unavoidable conclusion is that these two categories
of offenders are the Siamese twins of capital punishment, inextricably intertwined
and impossible to separate without doing great damage to logic and legal analysis.

* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University. In considering factors that might influence the author's
perspective in this article, readers should know that the author has served as defense counsel for several juvenile
offenders on death row, such as Jerome Allen (Florida), Paula Cooper (Indiana), Kevin Stanford (Kentucky), and
Wayne Thompson (Oklahoma). An early version of this article was presented by the author at the symposium,
BeyondAtkins: A Symposium on the Implications ofAtkins v. Virginia sponsored by the NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
and held on Oct. 19, 2002, at the University of New Mexico School of Law in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. The original Siamese twins were a set of twin boys, Chang and Eng, born in Siam in 1811. This term
has now come to mean any set of twins born with their bodies joined, the successful surgical separation of which
can be extremely difficult if not impossible. WEBSTER'S CONCISE ENGLISH DICTIONARY 8 (1992). Page Chichester,
A Hyphenated Life, available at http://blueridgecounty.comi/newtwins/twins.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). The
same sort of inseparable connectivity can be seen between these two categories of capital offenders.
3. The term "juvenile offenders" is used throughout this article to refer to persons who committed criminal
offenses when under the age of eighteen. Adolescence is a more general term referring to the stage of life between
puberty and adulthood.
4. The definition of the term "mentally retarded offenders" throughout this article is taken from the
Supreme Court's working definition: subaverage intellectual functioning (e.g., IQ below seventy) and significant
limitations in adaptive skills, both of which became manifest before the age of eighteen. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
5. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Defending Categorical Exemptions to the Death Penalty:
Reflections on the ABA 's Resolutions Concerning the Execution ofJuveniles and Persons with Mental Retardation,
61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1998).

7. 536U.S.at321.
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II. EVOLVING LAW OF DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 9
A. Major U.S. Supreme Court Cases
Prior to twenty years ago, the issue of the death penalty for crimes committed by
juvenile offenders had been generally ignored by American law.' ° Almost no
statutes and only a few lower level cases had ever addressed the issue." The U.S.
Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of this practice until the early
1980s, and never have more than four Justices agreed completely on this
constitutional issue.1 2 The first case arose in 1981 when the Court considered a
certiorari petition putting forward the specific issue of the constitutionality of capital
punishment for an offense committed when the defendant was only sixteen years
old.' 3 The Supreme Court decided Eddings v. Oklahoma in 1982 on a different issue,
but Justice Powell's majority opinion noted in passing that "the chronological age
of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight."' 4 However, that
five-Justice majority opinion did not reach the constitutional issue upon which
certiorari had been granted. Chief Justice Burger's four-Justice dissent would have
reached that ultimate constitutional issue and would have rejected any Eighth
Amendment bar to the execution of sixteen-year-olds. 5 In fairness, Burger's dissent
in Eddings devoted only a few lines to this constitutional issue, cited no legal or
psychiatric authorities for its decision, and cannot be said to have fully and
thoroughly explored the issue.6
After Eddings in 1982, the Court continued to be tempted by the issue but for
several years did not grant certiorari on the question. Burger v. Kemp 7 involved an
offender who was only seventeen years old at the time of his crime, but the case did
not directly raise the minimum age issue. In his dissent, Justice Powell nonetheless
questioned the constitutionality of the death penalty for that seventeen-year-old

8. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
9. This section of this article is based in large part upon the analysis in Victor L. Streib, Executing Juvenile
Offenders: The Ultimate Denial of Juvenile Justice, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 121 (2003).
10. For the author's general view of the history and evolution of the death penalty, see VICTOR STREIB,
DEATH PENALTY IN A NUTSHELL 1-8 (2003) [hereinafter STREIB, NUTSHELL].
11. See generally VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES (1987) [hereinafter STREIB,
JUVENILES].

12. See In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002) (a five-to-four decision, with only the four dissenters
addressing the constitutional issue); Patterson v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 24 (2002) (a six-to-three decision, with only the
three dissenters addressing the constitutional issue); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (a four-one-four
decision); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (a four-one-three decision); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104 (1982) (a five-to-four decision, with only the four dissenters addressing the constitutional issue).
13. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981). Eddings was charged
and convicted of first-degree murder for killing a police officer. Id. at 106.
14. Id. at 116.
15. Id. at 120, 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
16. See id. at 128.
17. 483 U.S. 776 (1987). Burger kidnapped a cabdriver, physically abused him, and then killed him and was
convicted of murder. Id. at 776, 779.
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offender and lamented the majority's unwillingness to wait for a decision squarely
on this constitutional issue."
Even as Burger was being decided, the Court granted certiorari in the case of a
fifteen-year-old offender and was to decide that case in 1988." In Thompson v.
Oklahoma, the issue was couched as "whether the execution of [a death] sentence
would violate the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of 'cruel and
unusual punishments' because petitioner was only 15 years old at the time of his
offense."2 In a four-one-three ruling, the Thompson Court held that such an
execution would be unconstitutional. 2
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion began with consideration of the obligatory
Eighth Amendment benchmark-the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."22 Such "standards of decency" require consideration
of three factors: (1) current legislation on the acceptance or rejection of the death
penalty for offenders younger than certain age limits; (2) jury willingness to impose
death sentences on juveniles even where authorized; and (3) views of informed
organizations and other nations on the acceptability of the juvenile death penalty. 3
The Thompson plurality concluded that the Court is the ultimate arbiter of the limits
of "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.2 4 Justice Stevens' opinion measured the unique culpability ofjuveniles
and the contribution of the juvenile death penalty to the acceptable social purposes
of that penalty. 25 The Thompson plurality concluded that juveniles generally have

less culpability for their misdeeds and have a significant capacity for growth.26
These unique characteristics, when blended with society's fiduciary obligations to
its children, render retribution "simply inapplicable to the execution of a fifteenyear-old offender."27 The other major criminological purpose of the death penaltygeneral deterrence of other similarly minded, potentially homicidal juveniles-was
also discounted for juvenile offenders as inconsistent with what is known about the
manner in which adolescents contemplate and evaluate the consequences of their
behavior.2 8
Because Wayne Thompson was only fifteen years old at the time of his crime, the
plurality believed it had no compelling need to address Thompson's argument that
eighteen was the most logical age at which to draw the line. 29 Whatever might be the
ultimate determination of this constitutional age limitation, the Thompson Court held

18. Id. at 819, 822 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
19. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987), granting cert. to Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780
(Okla. 1986), vacated and remanded,Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion). Thompson
was convicted of brutally murdering his former brother-in-law. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 819.
20. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-19 (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 838 (plurality opinion), 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 821.
at 821-22.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 833.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 833-37.
27. Id. at 837.
28. Id. at 837-38.
29. Id. at 838.
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the minimum age line was certainly no lower than sixteen.3" The crucial fifth vote
to reverse Wayne Thompson's death penalty was added to the Thompson plurality's
four votes by Justice O'Connor's solitary concurring opinion.3 Thompson
3 2 had only
three dissenters: Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Scalia.
Stanford v. Kentucky 33 was decided one year after Thompson. Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion agreed with Justice Stevens' Thompson plurality that "evolving
standards of decency" must be manifested primarily in the actions of the various
legislatures and juries facing the issue.34 In his plurality opinion in Stanford, Justice
Scalia expanded upon most of the points he had made in his dissent in Thompson,
particularly in characterizing the legislation and jury sentences for offenders ages
sixteen and seventeen in comparison to the issue of fifteen-year-olds in Thompson.35
Several states had express minimum ages of sixteen and seventeen for the death
penalty in their statutes and to these Justice Scalia added those states without any
express minimum ages whatsoever on the premise that they meant to include
juveniles of sixteen and seventeen.36 The practice of sentencing and executing
offenders age sixteen and seventeen clearly was not as rare as for fifteen-year-old
offenders, and Justice Scalia' s plurality in Stanford interpreted such rarity as simply
laudable prudence rather than a clear signal of an evolved standard of decency
rejecting the practice.
Justice O'Connor's pivotal concurrence in Stanford began with a reminder that
her opinion required a specific, express minimum age in the pertinent death penalty
statute before an eligible offender can be executed unless such execution is clearly
not forbidden by a national consensus. 5 Justice O'Connor concluded that the
executions challenged in Stanford could proceed since "it is sufficiently clear that
no national consensus forbids the imposition of capital punishment on 16- or 17year-old capital murderers. 39
Justice Brennan's dissent in Stanford tracked closely the analytical scheme of
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Thompson.4" After finding the juvenile death
penalty generally rejected by legislatures, juries, informed organizations, and other
nations,4' the Stanford dissent noted the lesser moral culpability of juveniles and the
failure of the juvenile death penalty to make any measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 42 The four Stanford

30. Id.
31. Id. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. Justice Powell had retired the year before Thompson was decided, leaving the Court with only eight
members. By the time Thompson was argued, Justice Powell's position had not yet been filled by Justice Kennedy,
so only eight Justices decided the case.
33. 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion). Stanford was seventeen years old when he and an accomplice
raped and killed a gas station attendant after robbing the store. Id. at 365.
34. Id. at 368-69.
35. Id. at 369-75.
36. Id.at370-72.
37. Id. at 373-74.
38. Id. at 380 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
39. ld. at 381.
40. ld. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 384-90.
42. Id. at 390-405.
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dissenters (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) would have drawn
the minimum constitutional age line at eighteen.43
From 1989 to 2002, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of capital
punishment for juvenile offenders. As a result, the thirty-eight states and two federal
jurisdictions (civilian and military) with death penalty statutes tried to gain meaning
and guidance from Eddings, Thompson, and Stanford. This has been a daunting task.
For example, in Eddings in 1982, four Justices (Burger, White, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist) found in dissent no constitutional bar to the execution of sixteen-yearolds." However, by 1988 in Thompson, Justice Blackmun had changed his position
from Eddings to agree that the execution of sixteen-year-olds is barred by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.45 By the time that Thompson was decided, only three
members of the Supreme Court (Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and White) thought
otherwise.46
During this interim, Justice Powell retired from the Court in 1987. In one of the
last opinions he authored, Justice Powell seriously questioned the constitutionality
of the death penalty for seventeen-year-old offenders and lamented the majority's
unwillingness to wait for a decision squarely on this issue. 47 Given his opinions in
Eddings48 and Burger,'49 and his widely-reported comments after retirement, 50 it
seems reasonable to assume that Justice Powell, had he delayed his retirement just
one year until 1988, would have joined Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in
Thompson.5t With a delay in retirement until 1989, just one additional year, Justice
Powell could have been expected to join Justice Brennan's opinion in Stanford,52
transforming that four-Justice dissenting opinion into a five-Justice majority ruling
by the Court that execution of seventeen-year-old offenders is prohibited by the
Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The result of these few opinions by the Supreme Court on this issue over a sevenyear period has been to provide razor-thin majority decisions, going opposite
directions in back-to-back years and being changed completely by the fortuity of
Justice Powell's year of retirement. This slender and battered reed upon which this
issue now rests, in combination with the continued developments and discussions
since 1989, has sorely tempted the Court to reenter this arena.
In August 2002, three Justices dissented from the denial of a stay of execution of
a juvenile offender in Patterson v. Texas.53 Justice Stevens' dissent in Patterson
reaffirmed his belief that Justice Brennan's dissent in Stanford had "correctly
interpreted the law. 54 Justice Stevens went on to express an interesting proposition:
"Given the apparent consensus that exists among the States and in the international
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 405.
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 120, 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion, joined by Blackmun, J.).
See id. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.)
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. at 819, 822 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
455 U.S. at 105.
483 U.S. at 817 (Powell, J., dissenting).

50. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994).

51. 487 U.S. at 818 (plurality opinion).
52. 492 U.S. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. 123 S. Ct. 24 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
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community against the execution of a capital sentence imposed upon a juvenile
offender, I think it would be appropriate for the Court to revisit the issue at the
earliest opportunity.""
56
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, also wrote in dissent in Patterson.
While Justice Ginsburg endorsed Justice Stevens' reasoning, she went on to point
out that the Court's very recent ruling that the death penalty for the mentally
retarded violated the Eighth Amendment 7 "made it tenable for a petitioner to urge
the reconsideration of Stanford v. Kentucky."" Nonetheless, the Court denied the
stay of execution and refused to hear the case. Toronto Patterson, age seventeen at
the time of his crime, was executed by Texas later on the same day as the Court's
decision, August 28, 2002,"9 quite possibly having the dubious honor of being the
last juvenile offender executed in U.S. history.
Hauntingly, the case of Kentucky's Kevin Stanford' came before the Supreme
Court again in the fall of 2002. Arising in two forms, the first case was a
straightforward appeal from the denial of Stanford's habeas corpus relief at the Sixth
Circuit, which the Supreme Court denied without opinion.6" The other case was an
original petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Stanford in the Supreme Court
(Stanford 11).62 Although also denied by the Supreme Court two weeks after the
denial of the appeal from the Sixth Circuit, this original petition prompted a fourJustice dissenting opinion.63 Justice Stevens' dissent noted the unusual procedural
posture of Stanford II but asserted that this was insufficient to bar reconsideration
of the basic constitutional issue.' It seems probable, nonetheless, that Justice
Stevens' inability to garner sufficient votes to reconsider the juvenile death penalty
issue stemmed more from the Court's longstanding general unwillingness to grant
original petitions for writs of habeas corpus than from a disinterest in the juvenile
death penalty issue. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Souter, went on to send a very clear signal. Justice Stevens briefly noted the
continuing viability of the dissent's position in Stanford and the unidirectional
movement of legislatures away from this practice.65 In Patterson,Justice Stevens'
three-Justice dissent had modestly suggested that it would be "appropriate for the
Court to revisit the issue at the earliest opportunity. ' 66 In Stanford II, Justice
Stevens' four-Justice dissent moved well beyond a mere suggestion that the Court
revisit the issue:

55. Id.
56. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
58. 123 S. Ct. 24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. See Adam Liptak, Justices Call for Reviewing Death Sentences for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
2002, at Al.
60. This is the same Kevin Stanford as the petitioner in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). Although
age seventeen at the time of his crime in 1981, he was by this time age 39, having been on Kentucky's death row
continuously since 1982.
61. Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 136 (2002).
62. In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002).
63. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 24 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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All of this leads me to conclude that offenses committed by juveniles under the

age of 18 do not merit the death penalty. The practice of executing such young
offenders is a relic of the past and is inconsistent with evolving standards of
decency in a civilized society. We should put an end to this shameful practice.67
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Justice Stevens' opinion in StanfordII was
that those four Justices reached this final conclusion even without the benefit of the
written briefs and oral arguments of the parties that would have been part of a full
hearing on the issue. In any event, as of late October 2002, Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens are on record as opposing the death penalty for
juveniles. These are the same four Justices, along with Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, who signed the majority opinion in Atkins v. Virginia finding the death
penalty for mentally retarded offenders to be unconstitutional.68 Given the nearly
identical analysis of these two issues, one might predict that the six Justices who
joined the majority opinion in Atkins would join together in a juvenile death penalty
case, should one come before the Court. without procedural problems. They may
soon get that opportunity, since as of this writing there are at least two more juvenile
death penalty cases in the final briefing process about to be ripe for the Court's
consideration.69
B. State Cases and Statutes
Several state courts have recognized and enforced the Supreme Court rulings on
these federal constitutional issues, as well as occasionally relying upon the
provisions of their own state constitutions. For example, state court rulings in
Alabama,7" Florida, 7 Indiana,72 and Louisiana73 have enforced Thompson74 and
prohibited the death penalty for fifteen-year-olds. In State v. Furman,75 the
76
Washington Supreme Court went well beyond the floor established by Thompson
and Stanford77 and unanimously held the entire juvenile death penalty to be
prohibited by the constitution of the State of Washington. More narrowly, the
Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the Florida Constitution to prohibit the death
penalty for sixteen-year-old offenders. 78 Although not extensive, all of the state case
law appears to be moving in the same direction.
In addition to this slow but steady evolution of state case law, the Supreme Court
has always been interested first and foremost in the progression of state statutory
law as a measure of the evolving standards of cruel and unusual punishment. Since

67.
68.
69.
(Sept. 19,
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. at 475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2002), appeal docketed sub nom. Hain v. Mullin, No. 02-6438
2002); Foster v. (Mississippi), appeal docketed, No.
Flowers v. State, 586 So. 2d 978 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1994).
Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989).
Dugar v. State, 615 So. 2d 1333 (La. 1993); State v. Stone, 535 So. 2d 362 (La. 1988).
479 U.S. 1084 (1987).
858 P.2d 1092 (Wash. 1993).
479 U.S. 1084.
492 U.S. 361 (1989).
Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999).
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the Court's last actual holding on this issue,79 what has been the reaction of our forty
death penalty jurisdictions? This question is identical to that asked by the Court in
Gregg v. Georgia"° when it sought an indication of the nation's reaction to Furman
v. Georgia.8 ' The Court in Gregg was singularly impressed that at least thirty-five
states and the federal government had enacted new death penalty statutes after their
previous statutes were knocked down by the impact of Furman.2 Even in the face
of that very discouraging ruling in 1972 by the Supreme Court, within only a few
years (1972 to 1976) the legislatures had made clear their unmistakable desire to
have the death penalty.
The reactions of our forty current death penalty jurisdictions since Stanford 3 in
1989 are of equal significance. Despite questions about consistency and clarity in
the 1980s cases on the juvenile death penalty, Stanford84 was universally understood
to have given the green light to death penalty jurisdictions wanting to impose that
sanction upon offenders as young as sixteen at the time of their crimes. A
predictable nationwide reaction, such as that which occurred during the period
between Furman5 (1972) and Gregg 6 (1976), would have been for almost all death
penalty jurisdictions with statutory minimum ages of seventeen or eighteen to lower
those minimum ages to sixteen as constitutionally permitted by Stanford. However,
not a single death penalty jurisdiction has lowered its statutory minimum age from
seventeen or eighteen to sixteen since Stanford was decided in 1989. If the 1972 to
1976 phenomenon was seen as embracing a national standard approving of the death
penalty in general despite significant constitutional impediments, then the 1989 to
2002 phenomenon must be seen as refusing to embrace a national standard
approving of the death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders despite
the removal of constitutional impediments.
Instead of a clear national standard of the age of sixteen emerging, American
death penalty jurisdictions have moved in precisely the other direction. The most
recent is Indiana, which in 2002 raised its statutory minimum age from sixteen to
eighteen.8 7 The Montana legislature did the same thing in 1999.88 Kansas enacted an
entirely new death penalty statute in 1994 containing a minimum age of eighteen. 9
When New York returned to the death penalty and enacted its current statute in
1995, it set a minimum age of eighteen for the death penalty.9 ° In addition, at least
nine other death penalty states-Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas-have recently considered
legislative amendments to raise their statutory minimum age for the death penalty

79. Stanford, 492 U.S. 361.
80. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
81. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). This case reviews three decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia affirming the

imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 238.
82.
83.

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 180-8 1.
492 U.S. 361.

84. Id.
85. 408 U.S. 238.
86. 428 U.S. 153.

87.
88.
89.
90.

S. 426, 112th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2002 Ind. Laws.
H.B. 374, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess., 1999 Mont. Laws; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102.
KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4622 (West 2001).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2002).
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from sixteen or seventeen to eighteen. 9' These legislative and court actions are
directly opposite of what would have been expected following Stanford. Instead of
rushing through the door opened by Stanford, American death penalty jurisdictions
have said "no, thank you" and have moved toward age eighteen as their minimum
age.
C. CurrentStatus of Juvenile Death Penalty Law
Thirty-eight states and the federal government (both civilian and military)
currently have statutes authorizing the death penalty for capital crimes, almost all
of which are forms of murder. Of those forty death penalty jurisdictions, eighteen
jurisdictions (forty-five percent) have expressly included age eighteen at the time
92
of the crime as the minimum age for eligibility for that ultimate punishment.
Another five jurisdictions (thirteen percent) have included age seventeen as the
minimum. 93 The other seventeen death penalty jurisdictions (forty-two percent) use
age sixteen as the minimum age, either through an express age in the statute (five
states) or by court ruling (twelve states).94
This statutory information reminds us that the death penalty for juvenile offenders
remains legally available in over half of American death penalty jurisdictions.
However, the ultimate measure of the evolving standard of decency regarding the
death penalty for juvenile offenders is jurisdictions' willingness to carry such cases
through to actual executions. In the years immediately prior to the Stanford decision
in 1989, actual execution of juvenile offenders had stopped, presumably awaiting
the outcome of Thompson and Stanford.95 One might expect such executions to have
returned to a "normal" level during the 1990 to 2002 time period.
Several states continued only to dabble in this practice during this thirteen-year
period, sending out signals by occasionally sentencing juvenile offenders to death
but never executing them. Examples include Alabama with sixteen such sentences
from 1990 through 200296 but last executing a juvenile offender in 1961.9' Similar
is Florida, with fifteen juvenile death sentences since 1990,98 but Florida's most
recent juvenile execution was in 1954. 99
During this thirteen-year period of 1990 to 2002, there were a total of 682
executions in the United States.'l° Of these 682 executions since 1990, only eighteen
(2.6 percent) have been of juvenile offenders.'0 ' It is of critical importance that

91. See Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions for Juvenile
Crimes, January 1, 1973-December 31, 2002 7 (Oct. 9, 2002) availableat http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/
juvdeath.pdf. (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Streib, Death Penalty Today].
92. See id. at 8, tbl. 3.
93. Id.at 7.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 4, tbl.1.
96. See id. at 21-24.
97. STREIB, JUVENILES, supra note 11, at 191.

98. See Streib, Death Penalty Today, supra note 91, at 21-24.
99. See STREIB, JUVENILES, supra note 11, at 193.
100. See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the U.S. 1976-1986,1987-1990,1991,1992,1993,
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 (2003), availableat http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last
visited Apr. 5, 2003).
101.

See Streib, Death Penalty Today, supra note 91, at4 tbl. 1.
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eleven of these eighteen juvenile executions occurred in Texas and three others
occurred in Virginia. 0 2 Looking at the rest of the United States except for Texas and
Virginia, a total of thirty-one states executed a total of 353 offenders from 1990 to
2002.113 Only four (one percent) were of juvenile offenders, executed in Louisiana
(1990), Georgia (1993), Missouri (1993), and Oklahoma ( 19 99 ).14 However, it
cannot be said that these four states are firmly in the fold of executing juvenile
offenders. Prior to these recent-era juvenile executions, Louisiana last executed a
juvenile in 1948, Georgia in 1957, and Missouri in 1921. Oklahoma had never
executed a juvenile offender prior to 1999.' 5
Although twenty-two states officially permit this practice, Texas and perhaps
Virginia are the only two jurisdictions within the entire United States that have
significantly embraced the execution of juvenile offenders since Stanford.°6 During
1990 to 2002, Texas executed 251 persons, eleven (four percent) of whom were
juvenile offenders.17 As of December 31, 2002, Texas had twenty-eight juvenile
offenders on its death row and indicated its intent to continue to execute such
offenders.10 8 Virginia executed seventy-eight persons during 1990 to 2002, only
three (four percent) of whom were juvenile offenders." °9 However, Virginia has
sentenced only one juvenile offender to death for the past several years and has only
one juvenile offender now on death row."0 Whether Virginia will continue to
execute juvenile offenders, therefore, is not completely clear."' While four percent
is still a very small portion of all executed offenders and thus may not be truly
significant, it still might be argued that the "standards of decency" have not
"evolved" in Texas and perhaps Virginia to the point of putting this practice behind
them. Instead, those two states might be said to continue to embrace the death
penalty for juvenile offenders. However, the operative "standards of decency" under
the Eighth Amendment must flow from national practices and procedures and are
not dictated by a few rogue states." 2 One clear indicator of a national consensus
against this practice is that at the present time only one or two states can be
described as continuing to embrace the actual execution of juvenile offenders.

102. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 100.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See STREIB, JUVENILES, supra note 11, at 195, 197, 199, 203.
106. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 100.
107. Id.
108. See Streib, Death Penalty Today, supra note 91, at 30-32.
109. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 100.
110. See STREIB, NUTSHELL, supra note 10, at 5.
Ill. As of this writing (Jan. 2003), Virginia is preparing to try a very high profile juvenile offender, Lee
Malvo, for capital crimes stemming from the sniper shootings in the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area in 2002.
Jurisdiction over Malvo's case has been transferred to the adult criminal court where death penalty charges are
expected to be filed. See Jayson Blair, Teenager Held in Sniper Case Will Be Tried as Adult, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2003, at A18. Nonetheless, actual execution of Lee Malvo remains unlikely if long-term Virginia practice prevails.
112. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977).
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III. EVOLVING LAW OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR
THE MENTALLY RETARDED
Prior to juxtaposing the Court's decisions in Thompson,"' Stanford,"4 and
Stanford 1115 with the Court's decision in Atkins, it may be helpful to consider
briefly the evolution of the law of the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders.
However, those seriously interested in this area of law should turn to the work of the
master, Professor James Ellis, as published in this symposium issue and elsewhere. 6
A. Characteristicsof Mentally Retarded Defendants
In 1992, the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) revised its
definition of mental retardation to read as follows:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing
concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable
adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills,
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure,
and work. Mental retardation manifests before age eighteen." 7
The component parts of this widely accepted definition are terms of art.
"Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning" can be measured through
intelligence tests that render an intelligence quotient (IQ) score. To meet the AAMR
definition of mental retardation, one must score below 70 on an intelligence test for
which the mean score is 100.1" In statistical terms, this means that any individual
who is mentally retarded is in the lowest 2.5 percent of the population in measured
intelligence. '
The AAMR definition also requires that an individual possess an actual disability
in an "adaptive skill area" that affects everyday life. 2 ° This component reflects an
attempt to focus the attention of public policy makers on the specific areas of
disability found within the mental retardation classification. Such a focus is helpful
in recognizing the wide range of behaviors affected by the disability. This awareness
is especially important when assessing the ability of a mentally retarded offender to
communicate and work with their defense attorney and, therefore, the lesser ability
of the defense attorney to present an adequate defense for a mentally retarded client.
"Mental age" is an additional technique used to assess the severity of a person's
mental retardation. 2' It is an attempt to compare the intellectual functioning of the
113. 487U.S. 815(1988).
114. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
115. In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002).
116. See, e.g., James W. Ellis, Disability Advocacy and the Death Penalty: The Road from Penry to Atkins
33 N.M. L. REV. 173 (2003).
117. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 5 (9th ed. 1992) (relied upon by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.3).

118. Id.
119. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5.
120. Id.
121. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
414,434 (1985).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 33

individual being tested with that of a mentally typical person.' 22 This is
accomplished by identifying for each item on an IQ test the age level at which a
typical person can successfully answer the question. 123 For example, if a person with
a chronological age of twenty receives a similar IQ score as a non-retarded child
with a chronological age of eleven, the twenty year old is said to have a mental age
of eleven.124 The death penalty arguments that flow from this mental age assessment
of mentally retarded defendants are obvious. If an extremely mature murderer with
the chronological age of fifteen or lower is not eligible for the death penalty under
Thompson, then a mentally retarded murderer with the mental age of fifteen or lower
should similarly be ineligible for the death penalty.
The perceived inability of the mentally retarded to adequately negotiate the
workings of the judicial system is often cited as a justification for their exclusion
from the death penalty.' 25 Research on the moral development of the mentally
retarded establishes that some mentally retarded individuals possess incomplete or
immature concepts of blameworthiness and causation. 12' As a result, a mentally
retarded defendant may plead guilty to a crime he did not commit simply because
he thinks that blame should be delegated to someone, and he is unable to master the
idea of causation and his role in the incident. 127 Similarly, a mentally retarded
in an effort to please an accuser, which may
defendant may eagerly assume blame
28
result in an unfounded confession.
Further difficulties confront a mentally retarded defendant when he seeks to deny
his disability or enhance his status in the courtroom. 129 Such a defendant may boast
of his strength or how he outsmarted the victim, when neither assertion is true. Few
mentally retarded defendants acknowledge their disability when arrested or at any
other time during their encounter with the criminal justice system. 31 This halted
moral development also is a factor in assessing culpability.' 3 ' Opponents of the
death penalty for mentally retarded offenders argue that when a mentally retarded
defendant's full moral reasoning ability is compromised, he cannot be held to have
the level of culpability that would justify punishment by death.' 32
B. Evolving Case Law and Statutes on the Death Penaltyfor Mentally Retarded
Offenders
The exemption of the mentally retarded from the death penalty apparently was
firmly established in English and American common-law jurisprudence.' 3 3 Early

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.

125. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
126. See generally Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 121.
127. Id.
128. See Caroline Everington & Solomon Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring Understanding and
Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL RETARDATION 212, 212-13, 535 (1999).
129. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 121, at 430.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 117, at 8.

133. See, e.g., David L. Rumley, A License to Kill: The Categorical Exemption of the Mentally Retardedfrom
the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1299 (1993).

Spring 2003] ADOLESCENCE, MENTAL RETARDATION, AND THE DEATH PENALTY

195

definitions of "idiocy" focused on both intellectual impairment and its resulting
impact on functional ability, making these definitions not dissimilar from today's
AAMR definition. The basic point of disagreement has always been in the
determination of what level of mental disability is sufficient for exemption from
criminal responsibility. The sixteenth century "counting-twenty-pence" test defined
134
an idiot as one who could not count to twenty, identify his parents, or cite his age.
Early eighteenth century courts promulgated the "wild beast" test, which exonerated
from the death penalty those individuals whose awareness
of their actions was no
35
more than that of an infant, brute, or wild beast.1
Prior to 1986, apparently no death penalty statute had addressed mental
retardation either as a mitigating circumstance or as a precluding factor.' 3 6 The
Georgia legislature amended its death penalty statute in 1986 to preclude the death
penalty for mentally retarded offenders, due in large part to extensive media
coverage of Georgia's 1986 execution of Jerome Bowden, who had an IQ of 65.37
The federal death penalty statute followed suit in 1988,138 and Maryland enacted a
similar provision in 1989.139 However, all other death penalty jurisdictions in the
United States as of that time made no mention of mental retardation.
The Supreme Court first considered this issue in 1989 in Penry v. Lynaugh. 4 °
Johnny Paul Penry was sentenced to death for rape and murder in Texas. 41
' Evidence
that Penry was mentally retarded and brain damaged was presented, but he was
found competent to stand trial. 142 John Paul Penry had an IQ of 50 and a mental age
of under seven, never having finished the first grade. 1 43 In Penry, however, the
Supreme Court found no constitutional bar to the death penalty for mentally retarded
capital defendants, primarily because at that time (1989) only three death penalty
jurisdictions expressly prohibited it.'" This did not constitute a national consensus
opposing the death penalty for the mentally
retarded under the Supreme Court's
"evolving standards of decency" analysis. 145
However, the issue did not fade away after 1989. An intensive political action
campaign kept the death penalty for the mentally retarded in the news media, and
state legislatures in death penalty states were asked to address the issue. As a result,
nearly half of the death penalty jurisdictions amended their death penalty statutes in
the 1990s to exclude mentally retarded offenders, generally using an IQ cutoff of 70,
and this legislative movement continued to grow steadily into the early years of the

134. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 121, at 416-17.
135. Rumley, supra note 133, at 1307.
136. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-14.
137. Id.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 314.
Id.
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 307-08.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 335.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 33

twenty-first century. 146 Mentally retarded defendants in death penalty cases
continued to litigate this issue, and the Supreme Court entered this arena once again.
The Supreme Court's 2002 ruling in Atkins 147 moved Eighth Amendment law on
this issue. Daryl Atkins and an accomplice had committed a robbery-murder, but
48
Atkins had an IQ of 59 and the mental age of a nine- to twelve-year-old child.
Concluding that the flurry of legislative activity, in conjunction with other
indicators, establishes a national consensus opposing the death penalty for the
mentally retarded, the Supreme Court in Atkins held that the application of capital
punishment is now cruel and unusual under the Eighth and Fourteenth
amendments.149 In addition to being rejected by a growing number of state
legislatures, the actual imposition of death sentences and actual executions upon
mentally retarded offenders is quite rare even in states that permit it, providing yet
further indication of a national consensus against it."' One lesser issue involved the
opposition to this practice found in public polls, in the positions of leading
organizations, and in comparative and international law. 5' The majority in Atkins
relied in small part on these findings, 5 but the three dissenting Justices thought that
a "national consensus" in constitutional law should not be built upon the whims of
public opinion or upon the practices of other countries.'53
In establishing this national consensus under the evolving standards of decency,
the Court in Atkins also measured it against the social purposes served by the death
penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders. 54
' The
Court held that mentally retarded offenders have less culpability for their crimes and
therefore do not merit maximum retribution.' The Court in Atkins also evaluated
potential offenders' ability to deliberate and premeditate their murders, finding "that
sort of calculus is at the opposite end of the spectrum from behavior of mentally
retarded offenders."' 56 Given this basic truth, they were unlikely to be deterred from
murderous conduct. 57
While Atkins held that the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments prohibit execution
of the mentally retarded, the Supreme Court left to the states the task of developing
ways to define this category in more detail. 58 This smacks of a macabre game of
"you can't execute them but we won't tell you who they are," but it is the same
approach used by the Court in regard to executing the insane."' Following Atkins,
the nation can expect a flurry of state legislative activity to amend death penalty
146. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15. See also J.L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital
Punishment: State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
59(1996).
147. 536 U.S. 304.
148. Id. at 308-09.
149. Id.at 321.
150. Id. at 315-16.
151. Id. at 316 n.21.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 321-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 346-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 318-19.
155. Id. at 318-20.
156. Id.
157.

Id.

158. Id. at 317.
159. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
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statutes, both to prohibit the execution of the entire category of mentally retarded
offenders and to define who is and is not in that category. Atkins endorsed the
common definition of mental retardation as having an IQ under 70 and having
significant limitations in adaptive functioning in skill areas such as communication,
self-care, home-living, and work. 6 ° The several hundred apparently mentally
retarded inmates on death row at the time Atkins was decided also will have to
litigate their cases individually to see if they fall within the protection of Atkins.
IV. COMPARING ADOLESCENT CHARACTERISTICS TO THE ATKINS
FACTORS FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED
The Atkins Court found sufficient factors concerning the death penalty for
mentally retarded offenders to conclude that the evolving standards under the Eighth
Amendment now prohibit that ultimate sanction for this specific class of
offenders.' 6 ' The analytical process followed by the Court in coming to this
conclusion is the now-entrenched approach of first looking to various objective
indicia of any possibly evolved standard, next measuring this punishment against
the broad social purposes served by the death penalty in general, and finally
bringing to bear the Court's own judgment as to the acceptability of this
punishment. The Court has been divided over the weightiness and even the
appropriateness of some of these factors in an Eighth Amendment analysis, but
Atkins makes clear that there are six Justices who subscribe to the same view. This
section sets out the essential Atkins factors for mentally retarded offenders and
contrasts them with comparable factors for juvenile offenders.
A. Legislation
If the "standards of decency" have evolved sufficiently to find a new Eighth
Amendment prohibition, then this evolution may be most apparent in the changing
legislation among the death penalty states. Indeed, all nine members of the Court
have made it clear that this is the most important factor to consider. 62 In Atkins, the
Court relied specifically upon the following points concerning legislation addressing
the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders:
No death penalty statute had prohibited the death penalty for mentally
retarded offenders prior to 1986.163
Between 1986 and 2001, a total of eighteen state legislatures and the federal
Congress enacted provisions prohibiting this practice."

160. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
161. ld.at309-21.
162. The Atkins majority reaffirmed that the "clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." Id. at 312 (citing with approval Penry, 492 U.S. at
331). This same reaffirmation appeared in the two dissenting opinions. Id. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 339-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 313-14.
164. Id. But see id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("18 States-less than half (47%) of the 38 states that permit
capital punishment (for whom the issue exists)-have very recently enacted legislation barring execution of the
mentally retarded.").
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Similar legislation passed at least one house of three additional state
legislatures in 2001-2002 but was not finally enacted.' 65
Legislative change has been consistently in the direction of prohibiting this
practice.' 66

The legislative history relevant to the death penalty for juvenile offenders has
been even more impressive. Instead of the absolute void prior to 1986 for mentally
retarded offenders, a total of twelve of the thirty-six death penalty states as of 1986
had express statutory provisions that prohibited the death penalty for offenders
under the age of eighteen.' 67 Therefore, Justice Scalia's pejorative comment about
the provisions concerning mentally retarded offenders being "very recently enacted
legislation"'6 8 certainly does not apply to juvenile offenders. Also, as of 2001, a total
of eighteen state statutes and the federal statute included express provisions
excluding mentally retarded offenders. 69 Comparing that to the provisions for
juvenile offenders, as of late 2002 a total of sixteen state statutes and the federal
statute prohibit this practice. 7 ° Admittedly, a total of sixteen states is less than
eighteen states, but it appears that provisions for juvenile offenders are only slightly
behind provisions for mentally retarded offenders. The Atkins Court was also
impressed that three additional state legislatures (Nevada, Texas, and Virginia) had
come close to passing mental retardation amendments to their death penalty
statutes. 171Matching this number, three states (Florida, Kentucky, and Texas) have
come close to passing juvenile offender amendments in the past few years.' 72
Finally, the Court was impressed that the direction of legislative change for mentally
retarded offenders was consistently in the direction of prohibiting that practice. 13
Similarly, the direction of legislative change for juvenile offenders has been
consistently in the direction of setting a minimum age of eighteen.174 Justice Scalia
commented in Atkins that legislative change for mentally retarded offenders, having
begun with no provisions at all, could only go in one direction. 75 Statutory
prohibitions of the death penalty for juvenile offenders began with twelve and grew
to sixteen, and they obviously could have gone in the opposite direction, particularly
given the Court's holding in Stanford v. Kentucky. 76
' Therefore, when legislation is
used as an indicator of an evolved standard of decency, it appears that juvenile
offenders fare at least as well as do mentally retarded offenders.

165. Id. at 315.
166. Id. But see id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that this is the only direction in which change
could have taken place).
167. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370.
168. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Streib, Death Penalty Today, supra note 91, at 8 tbl. 3.
171. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
172. Streib, Death Penalty Today, supra note 91, at 7.
173. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
174. See, e.g., Amnesty International, UNITED STATES OFAMERICA; Indecent and internationallyillegal;
The death penalty against child offenders 9-14 (Sept. 25, 2002) (Al-index: AMR 51/143/2002), abridged version
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR511442002 (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
175. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 344-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). See supra note 83-91 and accompanying text.
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B. Death Verdicts by Juriesand Actual Executions
Next in importance to legislative provisions are the individual decisions of juries
in death penalty cases.' 77 As an extension of such jury verdicts, actual execution of
mentally retarded offenders would also be important to consider. In Atkins, the Court
relied specifically upon the following points concerning jury verdicts and actual
executions:
Although the Court's analysis was limited by the scarcity of reliable data
concerning jury verdicts for mentally retarded capital defendants, it was
estimated that about ten percent of death row inmates are mentally retarded. 7 '
Apparently, twelve states executed thirty-five mentally retarded offenders
from 1984 to 2000.179

There is little need to pursue legislation barring the execution of mentally
retarded offenders in those states which authorize such executions but in which
the practice is uncommon.180
How do these points compare to the same measures for juvenile offenders?
Perhaps the most striking contrast is between the ten percent of death row inmates
who are mentally retarded as compared to the only two percent who are juvenile
offenders.' The contrast goes somewhat the other way for inmates executed from
1984 to 2000, with twelve of those inmates having been mentally retarded offenders
but seventeen having been juvenile offenders.' 82 However, while the age of the
juvenile offenders has been documented accurately, it is probable that the mental
retardation of some other executed offenders has been missed, making that actual
number higher than twelve. The discounting of those states that authorize the
practice but do not actually carry out executions also seems significant for juvenile
offenders. Although twenty-two states currently authorize the death penalty for
juvenile offenders, only seven states have actually carried out such executions since
1973, and since 2000 Texas stands alone in this practice. 183 Therefore, as with
legislation as an indicator, the practice of jury verdicts and actual executions seems
to place juvenile offenders in about the same position as mentally retarded
offenders.
C. Broader Community Considerations
The Court in Atkins made it clear that legislative trends, as well as actual death
verdicts and executions, are important indicia of any evolving standard of decency
under an Eighth Amendment analysis. '84 However, Atkins also clarified the murky
177. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315, 322-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[D]ata concerning the actions of
sentencing juries, though entitled to less weight than legislative judgments, 'is a significant and reliable index of
contemporary values'." (quoting Coker v. Georgia,433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977))).
178. Id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 316 ("Moreover, even in those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the
practice is uncommon... .Thus there is little need to pursue legislation barring the execution of the mentally retarded
in those States.").
181. Streib, Death Penalty Today, supra note 91, at 13.
182. Id. at 2 tbl. 1.
183. Id.
184. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
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issue of the relevance of broader community considerations. The six-Justice
majority opinion in Atkins relegated such considerations to a long footnote, 185 but
the significant result is that now a majority of the Court believes that they are to be
considered at all. 86
' Within these broader community indicia of an evolved standard,
the Court in Atkins specifically noted the following:
The death penalty for mentally retarded offenders is opposed by "several
organizations with germane expertise."' 7
188
It also is opposed by "widely diverse religious communities.'
Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty
for crimes committed
by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
89
disapproved.
Polling data indicates widespread consensus "that executing the mentally
retarded is wrong.''9
On these broader community considerations, the indicia for juvenile offenders are
even stronger than those for mentally retarded offenders. The death penalty for
juvenile offenders was opposed by an enormous number of such organizations when
Stanford was decided, 91 and that number has continued to grow. 92 Similarly,
opposition to the death penalty for juvenile offenders can be found in nearly every
organized religion in the world.'
As for "disapproval" within the world
community, every nation in the world now opposes the death penalty for juvenile
offenders.' 9' Indeed, only Texas and perhaps Virginia can be said to be continuing
this practice.' 95 Finally, the recent polling data available indicates that only about
one-quarter of Americans support the death penalty for juvenile offenders. 196In fact,
public support for the death penalty for juvenile offenders and other younger
offenders has always been very low: 1936: 26% support the death penalty for
persons under age twenty-one; 1965: 21% support the death penalty for persons
under age eighteen; 2002: 26% support the death penalty for persons under age
eighteen.' 97

185. Id.at3l6n.21.
186. Id. ("Although these factors are by no means dispositive, their consistency with the legislative evidence
lends further support to our conclusion...."). The three dissenters did not think such information should play any
role at all. Id. at 320-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 346-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 316 n.21.
188. Id.
189. id.
190. Id.
191. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 389 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. The Constitution Project, Mandatory Justice: Eighteen Reforms to the Death Penalty 11 (2001),
availableat http://www.ConstitutionProject.orgldpi/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
193. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 389 n.4.
194. See Connie de la Vega, Amici Curiae Urge the U.S. Supreme Court to ConsiderInternationalHuman
Rights Law in Juvenile Death Penalty Case, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1041, 1046 (2002).
195. Amnesty International, supra note 174, at 19-20.
196. Gallup News Service, Slim Majority of Americans Say Death Penalty Applied Fairly (May 20, 2002),
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
197. Id.
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D. PersonalCharacteristicsof the Mentally Retarded
Before turning to a more general analysis of the excessiveness of the death
penalty for certain categories of offenders regardless of their crimes, the Atkins
Court discussed the relevant personal characteristics of the mentally retarded. In the
first sentence of its opinion, the Court accepted that mentally retarded persons can
and should be convicted and punished for their crimes.1 98 However, the Court went
on to point out several characteristics of the mentally retarded militating against
their eligibility for the death penalty:
Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of
their impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. 9
They have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and to learn from experience, to engage
in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others. 2"
[T]here is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than
pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers
rather than leaders.2 '
The mentally retarded are "childlike."202
The "symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned."20 3
One simplistic characterization of mental retardation is that it is comparable to
being "childlike" 2°4 or to having the mental age of a child.2 5 In comparison, juvenile
offenders are not "childlike"-they actually are children. And, even if Justice
Scalia's concerns were accurate that the conditions of mental retardation "can
2 6 then surely he and the other members of the Court would be
readily be feigned,""
heartened by the fact that, given modem birth records, being under the age of
eighteen at the time of the crime can almost never be feigned.
Moving to each of the common characteristics of the mentally retarded, it is
beyond dispute that adolescent behavior includes being impulsive and having a
diminished capacity to learn from experience and to employ adult-level reasoning
and judgment. Indeed, these descriptions of the mentally retarded fit almost
perfectly the descriptions commonly used for juvenile offenders, and our legal

198. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
199. Id. The Court generally accepted the definition from AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992):

Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations
in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home
living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics,
leisure, and work.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
200. Id. at 317-20.
201. Id. at 317-18.
202. Id. at 350-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 352-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 350-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 121.
206. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 352-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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system has long recognized this truism.2 °7 Although crimes by adolescents can be
extremely harmful, "they deserve less punishment because adolescents may have
less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than
adults."2 8 The plurality in Thompson observed that "[ilnexperience, less education,
and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his
or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated
by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult."20 9
The Court's judicial notice of the characteristics of adolescent behavior simply
repeats what has been observed by the parents of teenagers everywhere and is
increasingly substantiated by the findings of scientific research. The organic brains
of seventeen-year-olds are not fully developed physically, particularly as to
judgment and impulse control.210 The agreement between the age of relatively
complete maturation of the frontal lobes and the age of social maturity is probably
more than coincidental. Without the explicit benefit of neuroscience, but through
cumulative everyday common sense, society recognizes that an individual assumes
adequate control over his or her impulses, drives, and desires only by a certain age.
Until that age, an individual cannot be held fully responsible for his actions in either
a legal or a moral sense. It further appears that adolescents caught up in capital
murder cases typically do not come up even to the standards of their seventeen-yearold peers. Other factors in their lives often hold back their mental development even
further, making them even less mentally culpable than others their age.211
E. Social Purposes Served by the Death Penalty in General
In Atkins, the Court returned to the two well-established social purposes served
by the death penalty: "retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
offenders." 2" 2 The Court's application of these two principles to mentally retarded
offenders resulted in the following conclusions:
[T]he lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not
merit that form (death sentence) of retribution.213
Justifications for the deterrence principle assume premeditation, deliberation,
and a cold calculus by the prospective offender, and "that sort of calculus is at

207. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may
be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws
and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature
and responsible than adults.
Id.
208. Id. at 115 n. 11 (citing TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD
YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978)).
209. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 (plurality opinion).
210. See, e.g., ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED MIND
(2001).
211. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON YOUTH IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
YOUTH IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 39-46 (2001).
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213. Id.

Spring 2003] ADOLESCENCE, MENTAL RETARDATION, AND THE DEATH PENALTY

203

the opposite
end of the spectrum from behavior of mentally retarded
214
offenders."
If the retribution purpose served by the death penalty does not apply to the mentally
retarded due to their "lesser culpability," then surely the same can be said for
juvenile offenders.2"' In addition, Thompson rejected the deterrence rationale as
simply unacceptable for young offenders.2" 6 Seventeen-year-olds simply do not and
cannot have a sufficient level of personal culpability to fully deserve the maximum
adult punishment known to our legal system.
F. Due Processand ProceduralFairness
Beyond the excessiveness of the death penalty as punishment for the crimes of
mentally retarded offenders, the Atkins Court expressed two more Due Process
concerns:
The enhanced possibility of false confessions.2" 7
Mentally retarded defendants... are typically poor witnesses, and their
demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes."'
These fears where mentally retarded offenders are involved also apply with nearly
full force to cases with adolescent offenders. Only very rarely will a juvenile
offender be the match for a skilled police interrogator, and they run a great risk of
being led into simply a confirmation of the interrogator's story.219 On the second
point, particularly male juveniles tend to be anxious to demonstrate their masculinity
and to avoid any indication of fear or weakness. Regardless of their actual feelings
about having taken the life of the victim, they cannot be expected to demonstrate
remorse at their public trial.22 '
G. The Court's Own Judgment and IndependentEvaluation
In the final and perhaps most controversial paragraphs of the Atkins opinion, the
Court compares and contrasts the objective indicia of the evolving standards of
decency with its own views of the acceptability of the death penalty for mentally
retarded offenders:
[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be
of the acceptability of the death penalty under
brought to bear on the question
22
the Eighth Amendment. '

214. Id.
215. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 ("Less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to
a comparable crime committed by an adult.") (footnote omitted).
216. Id. at 837-38.
217. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-20.
218. Id. at320-21.
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NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

"Our independent evaluation of the issues reveals no reasons to disagree with
the judgment" of the legislatures.222
Including mentally retarded offenders won't measurably advance the
deterrent or retributive purpose of the death penalty.223
The arrogance of this assumption of power takes one's breath away.224

The first point above indicates that a six-Justice majority of the Court has now put
behind them the controversy of whether the members of the Court should add their
own judgments as to the "standards of decency," neither making them determinant
of the outcome nor ignoring them altogether. Three Justices continue to reject this
factor as irrelevant, with perhaps the most outspoken member of the Court being left
breathless.2 5 If such judgments are relied upon in part in considering the death
penalty for mentally retarded offenders, then it presumably would go without
challenge that they would be relied upon in part for juvenile offenders.
A more difficult task is discerning what the individual views of the nine Justices
might be vis-A-vis the death penalty for juvenile offenders. The four Justices who
joined the Stanford II dissent did not elaborate on this point expressly, but their
personal judgments are clearly implied by their characterizations of the juvenile
death penalty as a "shameful practice" 226 that is a "relic of the past"2 27 and that is
"inconsistent with evolving standards of decency in a civilized society.2 2 8 The
additional Justices whose views might be unclear are Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor. In Atkins, these two key votes were cast for rejecting the death penalty
for the mentally retarded, based in small part upon their "own judgment., 229 It seems
more likely than not that they would also be cast for rejecting the death penalty for
juvenile offenders. The final element is advancing the general deterrent and
retributive purposes of the death penalty. For the same reasons that these purposes
are not served by executing mentally retarded offenders, the Court would be
expected to decide the same way for juvenile offenders.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSIS
The race to do away with the death penalty for juvenile offenders has now
reached the last lap. State by state, legislatures are amending their death penalty
statutes to require a minimum age of eighteen for eligibility for this ultimate
punishment.' County by county and parish by parish, trial juries are shying away
from sentencing juvenile offenders to death.23' Globally, the death penalty for
juvenile offenders has essentially disappeared, except for Texas and perhaps
Virginia.232 By the time the Supreme Court gets around to prohibiting this sanction
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as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, it may have almost faded away
on its own. It indeed is now a "relic of the past," 233 and future generations of lawyers
will read about it and wonder what we were thinking. However, this case-by-case,
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction eradication of this "shameful practice ' seems to be
taking forever, and meanwhile it still is claiming victims, at least in Texas.235
Therefore, the Supreme Court should heed the siren call of Atkins. The Court's
method for assessing the evolving standards of decency for Eighth Amendment
purposes is now part of the bedrock of modem death penalty law. Atkins is the most
recent application of this assessment method, and it resulted in a conclusion that our
evolved standards of decency no longer permit the death penalty for mentally
retarded offenders.236 Application of precisely the same assessment method to the
death penalty for juvenile offenders would result in precisely the same conclusion.
Legislation prohibiting the death penalty for juvenile offenders is nearly as
common as legislation prohibiting the death penalty for mentally retarded
offenders.237 More telling, juvenile age limits in death penalty statutes originated
well over a century ago in some key death penalty states and certainly cannot be
seen as just a passing fancy as it might have been for mentally retarded offenders.238
Another key indicator of the standards within local communities, juries are even less
willing to sentence juvenile offenders to death than they have been for mentally
retarded offenders. 239 The final measure, actual execution of condemned prisoners,
is apparently no more common for juvenile offenders than for mentally retarded
offenders.24 °
The Atkins Court reflected a strong majority commitment to including broader
community considerations within this constitutional assessment of the evolving
standards of decency.24' Compared to the opposition to the death penalty for
mentally retarded offenders, imposing such sentences for juvenile offenses is even
more commonly opposed by organizations with relevant expertise, by religious
communities, and by the world community. 24 2 Even measures as commonplace as
public polls indicate that only about one-fourth of the public has supported the death
penalty for juvenile offenders for the entire two-thirds of a century during which
these polling data have been gathered.243
When the Atkins Court turned to consider the personal characteristics of mentally
retarded offenders, they characterized them as impulsive and childlike. 2 " It seems
beyond doubt that juveniles are equally as impulsive, and they are not just childlike,
they actually are children. These personal characteristics led the Court to conclude
that retribution and deterrence simply do not apply as forcefully to mentally retarded
233.
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offenders, 45 and the same conclusion is unavoidable for juvenile offenders.
Mentally retarded offenders and juvenile offenders also share the same limitations
in working with defense counsel and dealing with several other essential aspects of
the criminal justice process.246
Given these many levels of analysis, the constitutionality of the death penalty for
mentally retarded offenders cannot be distinguished in a principled manner from the
constitutionality of the death penalty for juvenile offenders. If the former is cruel
and unusual punishment, then the latter is cruel and unusual punishment. The
question is not whether the Court will arrive at this conclusion, but when. As the
Court sifts through the constant stream of petitions before it for just the right
juvenile death penalty case on which to impose its now-standard constitutional
assessment method, yet more juvenile offenders are slipping closer and closer to
their dates with the executioner. As of this writing, the last one to die was Toronto
Patterson in Texas on August 28, 2002.247 He slipped away just hours after falling
one vote short before the Court.24 8 Will Toronto Patterson be the last juvenile
offender to be executed or will one or two more die before the right case gets before
the Court? Does any State Governor want to be known as the last in American
history to execute a juvenile offender?
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